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CITY LIABLE FOR SAFETY OF INFORMER
Schuster v. City of New York,
5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958)
Arnold Schuster supplied information to the police which led to the
capture of Willie Sutton, a notorious criminal. The newspapers gave
Schuster's role in the capture wide publicity. He received various threats
on his life and requested police protection. Three weeks after giving the
information he was shot and killed by person or persons unknown.
Plaintiff, as administrator, brought a wrongful death action on the
theory that the city was under a duty to exercise reasonable care for his
son's protection. The trial court's dismissal of the complaint was re-
versed by the New York Court of Appeals.
The question presented was one of first impression in New York.
The court decided that the municipality had the common law duty to
exercise reasonable care for the intestate's protection if it reasonably
appeared that he was in danger. The decision was bottomed upon the
reciprocal duty which citizens have in aiding law enforcement.' This
note is concerned with the duty placed on the city, the dissenting opinion,
and the question of whether such an action could be brought in Ohio.
A municipality does have a basic duty generally to provide for the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The United States Supreme
Court has on several occasions stated the proposition that a government
is under the duty to protect its citizens from violence when they give
information to the authorities.2 Thus, once a citizen has performed his
obligation of aiding law enforcement, a special duty arises on the part
of a city to use reasonable care for the collaborator's protection, at least
when it reasonably appears that he is in danger.
When a person has informed and is then injured or killed because
1 Historically, there was a duty established by the common law on citizens
to aid in law enforcement. Failure to prevent the commission of a felony, or
failure to disclose to the proper authorities the knowledge of a felony, constituted
the misdemeanor known as "misprision of felony." 1 BuRDIcic, THE LAW OF CRIME
440 (1946) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 486 (6th
ed. 1958). See 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1948): "Whoever, having knowledge of the
actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals
and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other
person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not
more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both." Today the
crime of misprision is almost obsolete although the duty to aid law enforcement
still exists. "It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to
proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would
punish him in every case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh for man."
Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556,575 (1822). See Babington v. Yellow
Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928).
2In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263
(1892); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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of this, it would seem that he or his administrator, under the holding in
the principal case, would still have the burden of proving negligence.
The law requires four factors in order to maintain a suit based on
negligence: (1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct to
protect others against foreseeable risks, (2) a failure to conform to the
standard, (3) a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and
the injury and, (4) a loss or damage.3
The collaborator must show that the duty of providing protection
was owed to him, and that the city had negligently failed to conform. 4
If it reasonably appeared that the collaborator was in danger, there is no
valid reason for distinguishing between negligent action and the negli-
gent failure to act where a duty exists.5
Generally, in a negligence action, plaintiff has the burden of
pleading and proving the causal connection between the defendant's act
or omission and his injury.' Plaintiff need not exclude all other possi-
bilities, but is only required to show that defendant's act or omission may
be reasonably inferred to be the cause of the injury.' The question of
proximate cause is normally one for the jury.5
The dissenting judges in the Schuster case believed that there was
no justification in the common law for this extension. They were im-
pressed by the heavy financial burden which the decision might thrust
upon municipalities. They stressed that a citizen was under no duty to
inform on a criminal and hence the reciprocal duty to provide reason-
able protection for the welfare of the informer did not arise.'
3 PROSSER, TORTS § 35, at 165 (2d ed. 1955).
4 "Negligence is a failure to comply with a legal duty and, to be a predicate
of an action, such duty must be one imposed for the benefit of the person in-
jured. . . ." Meyer Dairy Products Co. v. Gill, 129 Ohio St. 633, 640, 196 N.E.
428, 432 (1935).
5 ". . . [T]he distinction [between misfeasance and non-feasance' is believed
to be without significance as a test of liability." Buskey v. New England Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 91 N.H. 522, 523, 23 A.2d 367, 368 (1941).
6 Alling v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 156 Minn. 60, 194 NAV. 313
(1932).
7 Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N.Y. 1, 14 N.E.2d 828 (1938).
8 On the facts in this case, the plaintiff might ease his burden of proof
especially as to who shot the intestate by a loose application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. The doctrine applies where the instrumentality is under the exclusive
control of the defendant, the nature of the accident is such that it would not
ordinarily occur if due care had been exercised and the plaintiff was free of any
contributing cause. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. CHi. L.
REV. 519 (1934). The majority of the courts hold that after plaintiff has offered
proof of the accident and the injury, the jury can draw an inference of negligence
or causal connection. Fink v. New York Cent. R.R., 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N.E.2d 456
(1944). The burden of going forward is then shifted to defendant to disprove his
negligence. Foltis v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941).
9 For a case which held that a citizen does have a duty to inform, see
Attorney General v. Tufts, 329 Mass. 458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921) ; and see note 1
supra. But see People v. Lefkovitz, 294 Mich. 263, 293 N.W. 642 (1940).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
An additional point made by one of the dissenting judges was that
the intestate had assumed the risk: "... [T]he reward is the qui pro
quo not only for the information disclosed but for the assumption of the
risks of disclosure as well."' ° Assuming that the collaborator did receive
a reward, the defendant city in a negligence action would have the
burden of proving that the plaintiff assumed the risk. It must reasonably
appear that the plaintiff accepted a risk which he understood, and that
he knew the consequences of the risk accepted." But one could analogize
the problem here to the one in which a person goes to the rescue of an
individual placed in danger by the defendant's act.'" One author, in
writing on rescue and similar situations, felt that moral or social pressures
are such as not to warrant, without more, the conclusion that the risk
has been assumed. 3
Should such a factual situation as presented in the principal case
arise in Ohio, it is doubtful whether suit could be brought. In New York
the problem of sovereign immunity was not present because the state has
waived its immunity from suit. 4 Ohio courts allow negligence actions
against cities on proprietary functions, but not when governmental
functions are involved, unless a statute creates liability.' 5 The Ohio
Supreme Court has held that the maintenance of a police force is a
governmental function, and that negligent acts or omissions of the police
department do not subject the city to liability.' 6 In an early case the
court held that the city was not liable for failure to protect plaintiff's
property against mob destruction.'" This early decision has not been
overruled and would appear to be the law today.'"
The court in a recent decision has adhered to the governmental-
proprietary distinction. The majority opinion mentioned that in some
cases the municipality should be liable for injuries on governmental
functions, but felt that the legislature should remove this barrier.'" In
a wrongful death action where an unattended prisoner suffocated as a
10 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 544 (1958).
11 Masters v. New York Cent. R.R., 147 Ohio St. 293, 70 N.E.2d 898 (1947);
Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 86 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio App. 1949).
12 See Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
13 HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 294 (1933).
14 Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
15 Beebe v. Toledo, 168 Ohio St. 203, 151 N.E.2d 738 (1958) ; Tolliver v.
Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357 (1945).
16 Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
17 Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio
St. 375 (1861).
1853 OHIO Ops. ATT'y GEN. 733, 738 (1953). OHIO REV. CODE § 3761.03
(1953) provides: "A person assaulted and lynched by a mob may recover, from
the county in which such assault is made ...." While this statute reaches counties,
there is no comparable legislation which specifically applies to cities.
19 Broughton v. Cleveland, 167 Ohio St. 29, 146 N.E.2d 301 (1958).
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result of a fire, the Florida Supreme Court held that a city could be
sued where a governmental function was involved.2" The court felt
that the governmental-proprietary distinction was no longer suited to
American concepts of justice and should be abandoned.
The decision in the Schuster case would, under the facts of the
case, appear to be a logical extension of the law. So long as the in-
former's identity is known to the public, and particularly, known to the
criminal element who might be expected to seek revenge, he should be
given the fullest possible protection. If the law is to function adequately
it needs the aid of citizens. They should be given a reasonable measure
of protection so that they will not be discouraged from furthering the
enforcement of the criminal laws.
Richard F. Rice
20 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
